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 Abstract 
 
The disaster management literature is replete with surveys at the community and 
household levels. However, few exist at the organizational level. This study attempts to 
fill this void by examining the effect of organizational obstacles on disaster risk 
reduction. The data come from a survey of 227 organizations in Memphis, Tennessee. 
This study investigates three obstacles to disaster risk reduction: lack of organizational 
support, lack of information, and lack of financial resources. The findings show that 
organizations are more likely to engage in low-effort activities indirectly related to risk 
reduction and are less likely to engage in high-effort activities directly related to risk 
reduction.  The most important obstacle is lack of information about the frequency of 
disasters, magnitude of disasters, or organizational benefits of reducing disaster risks. 
Lack of financial resources and lack of organizational support are sometimes positively 
associated with risk-reducing activities, suggesting that, when organizations engage in 
risk-reducing activities, some obstacles become more apparent. The study concludes with 
implications, limitations, and future research strategies. 
 
CE Database subject headings: Disasters; risk management; information management; 
organizations; Tennessee. 
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Introduction 
 
Of all the goals that organizations aspire, the most important is probably survival. 
Disasters threaten the survival of organizations by disrupting services and destroying 
properties, lifelines, and life. To mitigate the threats from disasters, organizations may 
engage in a number of risk-reducing activities, such as bracing shelves and equipment, 
purchasing earthquake or flood insurance, developing an emergency plan, buying 
generators, and storing supplies (Dahlhamer and D’Souza 1997). Not all organizations 
engage in risk-reducing activities.  Indeed, organizations face a number of obstacles that 
impede any effort to reduce disaster risk.  
This study investigates three common obstacles (lack of organizational support, 
lack of information, and lack of financial resources) that prevent organizations from 
undertaking risk-reducing activities.  In doing so, this study addresses two research 
questions: (i) What risk-reducing activities do organizations engage in? (ii) To what 
extent do obstacles affect the adoption of risk-reducing activities? The former question is 
important in providing a survey of the status quo. The latter question is crucial in 
providing a basis for developing strategies for improving hazard mitigation and disaster 
preparedness policies and programs.  
The data come from a survey administered to a sample of 227 organizations in 
Memphis/Shelby County, Tennessee in the fall of 2006. Memphis makes for an 
interesting case study, in part, because it is located in the New Madrid Seismic Zone 
(NMSZ), an area of earthquake hazard (United States Geological Survey (USGS) 1998).    
This study starts by summarizing the literature on obstacles in disaster 
management and specifying expectations. The case study and methods of data collection 
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follow.  The bulk of the study lie in the results section, which shows that organizations 
are more likely to engage in low-effort activities that are often precursors to reducing 
risks than high-effort activities more directly related to reducing risks.  The findings also 
show that lack of information tends to be a bigger obstacle than lack of organizational 
support or financial resources.  The conclusions discuss policy implications, limitations, 
and recommendations for future research. 
  
Background 
  
Despite the pivotal role that organizations play in the economic, political, and 
social wellbeing of a society, the disaster management literature has largely neglected 
organizational level research (Tierney 1997; Webb et al. 2000).  Among the large-n 
quantitative studies-in particular-the focus has largely been either on household surveys 
(Jackson 1981; Davis 1989; Dooley et al. 1992; Edwards 1993; Farley 1998; Atwood and 
Major 2000) or on surveys of policy elites active in a community (Drabek et al. 1983; 
Mushkatel and Nigg 1987; Berke and Beatley 1992; May and Birkland 1994; Burby et al. 
2000; Wood 2004).  The reasons for this neglect are three fold: (i) Organizations are 
difficult to sample and survey in large numbers; (ii) The theoretical lines of inquiry 
usually direct research activities toward disaster awareness and response among regular 
citizen or among decision makers; and (iii) Some organizations are wary of the potential 
consequences of divulging disaster-related information (Auf der Heide 1989).  In relation 
to this current analysis, the few studies focusing on the organizational level suggest that 
organizations in Memphis/Shelby County do little to prepare for disasters (e.g., Nigg and 
Tierney 1994; Dahlhamer and D’Souza 1997; Webb et al. 2000).  Despite the neglect of 
organizational-level research, a number of factors from the disaster management 
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literature as well as organizational theory help explain why an organization engages in 
risk-reducing activities.  This study investigates the affect of three categories of these 
factors: information, financial resources, and organizational support. 
One of the most important factors affecting organizational activities is 
information. For example, information is often at the center of resource exchange that 
drive organizational decisions (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978) or as a vital stimulus for 
organizational formation and survival (Aldrich and Pfeffer 1976; DiMaggio and Powell 
1983).   Given the challenges of prediction, an important ingredient for disaster 
mitigation and preparations is acquiring and using information (Major 1998). Such 
information can alert a population to an impending disaster or various disaster risks.  
Other information comes in the form of strategies or alternatives to help individuals, 
organizations, and communities prepare for, or mitigate, disasters. Sources of disaster 
information include, but are not limited to, personal communication with other people, 
news media, government agencies, private organizations, non-profits, and research 
institutions.  
The disaster management literature has focused much on the role of information 
in household preparedness for earthquakes. For example, information on earthquake risks 
can induce households to take preparatory action (Jackson and Mukerjee 1974; Sullivan 
et al. 1977; Palm 1981; Turner 1983; Russell et al. 1995; Flynn et al. 1999; Atwood and 
Major 2000; Celsi et al. 2005).  A notable example is the impact of Iben Browning’s 
forecast that a major earthquake in the NMSZ would occur around December 3, 1990 
(e.g., Farley et al. 1993; Showalter 1993; Atwood and Major 2000). Although, some 
households believed Browning’s forecast, most were ambivalent, many planned schedule 
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changes, and fewer than those that planned to make changes actually did (Farley et al. 
1993). Similarly, Showalter (1993) found that respondents indicated that the prediction 
made them more aware and prepared for future earthquakes.   
This study investigates three information-related organizational obstacles: (i) lack 
of information about the frequency and magnitude of disasters (ii) lack of information 
about the potential impact of disasters, and (iii) unclear organizational benefits from 
disaster planning and mitigation. The magnitude and frequency relate to the force and 
relative timing of the actual event.  The impact of disasters deals with the outcome or 
effect from the event on an organization or the organization’s community.  Unclear 
organizational benefits mean that an organization is oblivious of the gains from disaster 
planning. Overall, the expectation is that organizations will be less likely to engage in 
risk-reducing activities if they lack information about the frequency and magnitude, 
impacts, or organizational benefits from reducing risks. 
Any organizational activity, especially preparing and mitigating disasters requires 
time, money, and effort (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Wyner and Mann 1986; May and 
Birkland 1994). In their study of local regulatory efforts to reduce earthquake risk, May 
and Birkland (1994) found that community resources are important in the local 
government effort and willingness to adopt seismic risk-reducing measures.  Lack of 
financial resources can constrain the adoption of earthquake mitigation policies (Bostrom 
et al. 2006).  This analysis focuses on whether organizations consider lack of financial 
resources as an obstacle to disaster risk reduction. The expectation is that organizations 
will be less likely to engage in risk-reducing activities if they lack financial resources. 
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Support from different levels within an organization provides a variety of 
functions that affect the probability of success (Selznick 1957; Yukl 1989; Bass 1997).  
From a broader perspective, researchers have documented the pivotal role policy 
entrepreneurs or champions play in the policymaking process (e.g., Kingdon 1984; Prater 
and Lindell 2000; Wood 2004; Olshansky 2005). These entrepreneurs are willing to, 
among other strategies, mobilize support for the issue if necessary (Berke and Beatley 
1992). Leadership support is just as important in organizations as it is in the 
policymaking arena.  Kaufman (1971) discusses the importance of internal organizational 
forces that can provide support or opposition to organizational change.  In the context of 
disasters, the support from upper-level management is crucial in the adoption of disaster 
risk-reducing measures but support at the lower-levels is also important in terms of 
execution.  The expectation is that organizations will be less likely to engage in risk-
reducing activities if support from the upper- or lower- levels within the organization is a 
major obstacle. 
Given these three common obstacles (lack of information, financial resources, or 
support) this paper proceeds to explain the degree that organizations engage in different 
types of risk-reducing activities.  At the household level, risk-reducing activities might 
include purchasing earthquake insurance, shutting off utilities, developing emergency 
plans, buying first aid kits, and storing food and water (Davis 1989; Mileti and O’Brien 
1992; Edward 1993; Farley et al. 1993).  At the community level or policy subsystem 
level, risk-reducing activities include building codes, zoning ordinances, and land use 
planning (Olshansky 1994; Flynn et al. 1999).  A common trend in the literature is to 
offer subjects an extensive list of risk-reducing activities to capture the range of their 
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behaviors (e.g., Davis 1989; Edwards 1993; Lindell and Prater 2002).  For this paper with 
its organizational focus, a range of risk-reducing activities are studied (e.g., discuss short-
term responses to disasters, engage in structural mitigation, or engage in nonstructural 
mitigation) as well as prerequisite activities (e.g., mention potential disasters in an 
organizational meeting).  
Two controls are important for both practical and theoretical reasons but are not 
the focus of this particular analysis. The first control is organizational size with the 
expectation that larger organizations will have more resources to invest in risk-reducing 
activities than smaller organizations.  Such a resource argument is common in the 
literature on disaster risk reduction at the household (Mileti 1999), community (May and 
Birkland 1994; Wood 2004), and organizational level (Tierney 2006). The second control 
is the sector in which an organization belongs, with a particular emphasis on education, 
health, and wholesale and retail. Evidence in the disaster literature indicates that some 
sectors e.g., finance, insurance, and real estate, do more to prepare for disasters than do 
others (Dahlhamer and D’Souza 1997).  
 
Case Study 
We examined a sample of organizations in Memphis/Shelby County, Tennessee. 
One of the most-studied risks facing the Memphis community is from earthquakes 
located in the NMSZ.  Earthquakes are the biggest disaster risk in the Memphis area 
(Charlier 2005). The three most powerful earthquakes in the United States (magnitude 
7.0-8.1) occurred in the New Madrid region (Memphis/Shelby County were not a 
settlement then) between December 16, 1811 and February 7, 1812 (USGS 1993; USGS 
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1998).  While many dispute the characterization of the risk, the USGS (1998) estimated 
that there is higher than 90% probability of a moderate earthquake (magnitude 6-7) 
hitting the New Madrid region within the next 50 years. In general, the seismic risk from 
the NMSZ is of low probability but high consequences (Olshansky 1994). Still, Memphis 
faces threats from other disasters, such as floods, tornadoes, ice storms, chemical spills, 
fires, severe storms, violent crimes, and toxic releases. A July 22, 2003 windstorm (later 
called Hurricane Elvis) left over 300,000 utility consumers in the dark; it took two weeks 
to restore power for everyone (Shepard 2003).  
A study of organizations in Memphis/Shelby County makes for an interesting 
case for several reasons. The rarity of major earthquakes in Memphis/Shelby County in 
recent time, poses challenges for organizations in deciding to reduce risk. Absence of 
such disasters could make organizations apathetic and reluctant to adopt measures to 
reduce disaster risks (May 1986; Lindell and Perry 2007).  In addition, disaster 
researchers have conducted myriad earthquake and disaster studies on the west coast, 
especially in California (Jackson and Mukerjee 1974; Kiecolt and Nigg 1982; Mulilis and 
Duval 1995; Argothy 2003; May and Wood 2003; Wood 2004; Celsi et al. 2005). 
However, very few studies have analyzed responses to disaster risks in Memphis 
(Edwards 1993; Nigg and Tierney 1994; Dahlhamer and D’Souza 1997; Webb et al. 
2000) and few in regions where risks have low probabilities and high consequences 
(Mushkatel and Nigg 1987; Olshansky 1994; Farley 1998; Major 1998; Atwood and 
Major 2000). 
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Methodology 
The data gathering procedure occurred in two phases. In the first phase, the 
research team conducted 15 exploratory interviews with 15 professional managers in 
Memphis/Shelby County in the spring and summer of 2006. The interviews consisted of 
open-ended questions, conducted in person or via telephone. Interview questions 
addressed attitudes toward hazard risk management and risk information, as well as 
organizational actions with respect to risk. The interviews took approximately 30-60 
minutes each. The research team typed up the interviews and returned them to the 
interviewees for comments and approval. 
The second phase consisted of a survey administered in fall of 2006. The 
interviews informed the survey questions. The research team mailed surveys to a 
stratified and partially random sample of 733 organizations in Memphis/Shelby County. 
With the help of the Memphis Regional Chambers of Commerce, the research team 
queried an online reference service, ReferenceUSA using the “number of employees” as a 
key index variable. The categories ranged from no employee to over 9999 employees. 
The research team re-categorized “number of employees” into seven categories (1-9, 10-
19, 20-49, 50-99, 100-249, 250-499, and ≥500) and stratified the population by employee 
size to allow the survey and representation of all organizational sizes in the Memphis 
Metropolitan Area. 
The research team then extracted 100 organizations from the first six categories 
and 101 from the last category, added all 32 utility companies, and surveyed these 733 
organizations. The research team delivered the surveys following a modification of the 
Dillman’s total design method (Dillman 2000). The research team mailed a letter on 
 11 
university letterhead to each of the 733 organizations, describing the study and seeking 
their participation.  The research team then mailed the first batch of surveys and 
followed-up with postcards, and then the second batch of surveys.  The research team 
addressed the surveys to owners and risk managers of these organizations.  The most 
frequent respondents were the manager (n=51), owner (n=44), President (n=37), Chief 
and Executive Officer (n=34). A variety of organizational representatives completed the 
rest including Vice Presidents, Executive Directors, Principals, and a Religious Leader. 
The response rate is about 31%, 227 organizations returned the survey but ten declined to 
participate in the study for various reasons (e.g. “business is not being fully operational” 
and “due to the private nature of our business”).  
Variable Measurement 
Dependent variables 
The dependent variables are ten different risk-reducing activities that 
organizations can undertake.  The survey asked with 1 = yes and 0 = no for the following 
question: “Has your organization engaged in any of these activities over the past year?” 
The list of activities included: 
1. Mentioned a potential disaster in an organizational meeting; 
2. Discussed in an organizational meeting short-term responses to disasters; 
3. Engage in non-structural mitigation measures (e.g., securing computers); 
4. Assessed or evaluated vulnerability to disasters or estimated potential loses 
from disasters; 
5. Attended disaster meetings/training courses outside your organization; 
6. Held disaster-related workshops or trainings within your organization; 
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7. Discussed in an organizational meeting long-term strategies for recovery from 
disasters; 
8. Provided information to customers/members of the community on issues 
related to disasters; 
9. Arranged site visits by consultants or experts to better prepare for disasters; 
and 
10. Engaged in structural mitigation measures (e.g., strengthening parts of a 
building). 
These ten activities offer an array of different risk-reducing activities that an 
organization may undertake.  The intent was to capture a full range of activities from low 
effort to high effort with some activities serving as stepping stones for other activities.  
Low-effort activities include, for example, mentioning a potential disaster in an 
organizational meeting.  High-effort activities include engaging in structural mitigation.  
Since some low-effort activities are often prerequisites for high-effort activities; all these 
activities are interrelated and not mutually exclusive. For instance, if respondents answer 
“yes” for engaged in structural mitigation, they are also likely to answer “yes” for 
mentioned a potential disaster in an organizational meeting.  We discuss the limitations of 
these measures in more detail in the conclusion.  
Independent variables 
The survey asked, “Please indicate the extent to which the following statements 
are obstacles to disaster planning in your organization”. We presented respondents with a 
list of six obstacles measured on a scale of 1 = minor obstacle to 5 = major obstacle.  
The six obstacles include one measure on lack of financial resources: “Lack of financial 
resources to prepare for disasters.”  There were three measures on lack of information:  
“Lack of convincing information about the potential impacts of disasters,” “Lack of 
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information about the frequency and magnitude of disasters,” and “Unclear 
organizational benefits from disaster planning and mitigation.” There were two measures 
on lack of support: “Lack of support from mid- and lower-level organizational members,” 
and “Lack of support from upper-level management within your organization.” To avoid 
multicollinearity in the logit models, scales were created that combined by their 
aggregate means the three information variables (factor loadings between .81 and .88, 
Cronbach’s Alpha = .81) and the two support variables (factor loading equal to .95, 
Cronbach’s Alpha = .88). 
Control variables  
   We operationalized Organizational size by the number of employees in an 
organization.  The distribution of employee size is 1-9 (n=37), 10-19 (n=22), 20-49 
(n=30), 50-99 (n=32), 100-249 (n=47), 250-499 (n=33), and ≥500 (n=14).  In the logit 
models, we use employee size as clusters to minimize correlated errors within categories.  
The organizations in this dataset represent a wide range of sectors, the most prominent 
are (i) health services (n=31); (ii) retail trade (n=23); (iii) educational services (n=19); 
(iv) wholesale trade (n=18); (v) manufacturing (n=17); and (vi) general services (n=29).  
The dataset also includes organizations representing churches, real estate, construction, 
banks, utilities, and recreational services.  In the logit models, we use the Educational 
sector, Health sector, and Wholesale/Retail trade as dichotomous variables and the 
remaining as the baseline.  
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Results 
Figure 1 shows the ten disaster risk-reducing activities ranked by the proportion 
of responding organizations that engaged in each activity.  For example, nearly 60% of 
responding organizations reported that they “mentioned a potential disaster in an 
organizational meeting.” The most common activities involve low effort or are indicative 
of activities indirectly related to actual risk reduction.  For example, more than half of the 
responding organizations “mentioned a potential disaster in an organizational meeting” or 
“discussed in an organizational meeting short-term responses to disasters”.  Nevertheless, 
60% of organizations in the sample engaged in non-structural mitigation (e.g., securing 
computers) and assessed or evaluated vulnerability to disasters or estimated potential 
losses from disasters -  two activities that possibly require high effort and that are more 
directly related to reducing risks.  The least mentioned activities, as mentioned  by 
approximately a quarter of respondents, possibly require more effort, such as providing 
information to customers or members of the community, arranging site visits by 
consultants, and engaging in structural mitigation.  The findings from Figure 1 are 
consistent with that of Dahlhamer and D’Souza (1997) who found that the most frequent 
preparedness activity businesses in Memphis engaged in are the “more generic type” 
(e.g., having first aid kit or extra medical supplies and attending meetings).  
 
-INSERT FIG. 1- 
 
Table 1 shows the percentages of respondents at each obstacle level and the 
means for the six measures of obstacles. For instance, 10 percent of responding 
organizations view lack of financial resources as a minor obstacle to prepare for disasters 
and 35 percent of responding organizations consider lack of financial resources a major 
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obstacle to disaster preparedness.  The obstacles list in Table 1 are ranked by their overall 
means from lack of financial resources scoring the highest (mean = 3.0) to lack of support 
from upper-level management scoring the lowest (mean = 2.0). 
Responding organizations’ scores for lack of financial resources are uniformly 
distributed.  The distribution of responding organizations shifts to the left with 
considerably more considering lack of support from mid- and lower-level members as 
well as upper-level members as minor obstacles.  An average respondent mentioned lack 
of financial resources as the most severe obstacle.  In comparison, an average respondent 
views lack of information about the frequency and magnitude of disasters and lack of 
convincing information about the potential impacts of disasters as moderate obstacles to 
disaster preparedness, with means just above the center of the five-point scale. For the 
organizational support and information scales (not shown in Table 1), the means are 2.0 
for the former and 2.7 for the latter (standard deviations are 1.1 and 1.2, respectfully). 
 
-INSERT TABLE 1- 
 
 Table 2 gives the predicted probabilities of the multivariate Logit analysis. For 
example, as lack of information shifts from its minimum (minor obstacle) to maximum 
(major obstacle), there is a 73% decrease in the probability of holding workshops, 
holding all other variables constant at their means. We listed the risk-reducing activities 
from left to right by their Pseudo R
2
. The three obstacle classifications are on the left and 
below them are the controls - dichotomous variables for education sector (e.g., schools) 
health sector (e.g., hospitals), and wholesale and retail sector (e.g., wholesale burglary 
alarm systems and restaurants, respectively). We calculated robust standard errors by 
organizational size and the models show adequate fit with the Pseudo R
2
, ranging from 
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0.18 for held disaster-related workshops/trainings within the organization to 0.03 for 
engaged in non-structural mitigation. 
  The most consistently significant obstacle in Table 2 is the lack of information 
scale. The predicted probabilities for the lack of information scale are always negative 
and significant in six of the ten dependent variables.  Shifts from the minimum to 
maximum on the lack of information scale are associated with decreases in probabilities 
for the dependent variables ranging from 42% to 73%.  Lack of information tends not to 
be a significant factor for activities most frequently done by responding organizations: 
engaged in non-structural mitigation, discussed short-term responses, and mentioned 
disasters in a meeting (nearly 60% of respondents from Figure 1). Thus, it is possible that 
information is an important indicator that is associated with organizations that do more 
than just talk about disasters with little action or effort. 
 
-INSERT TABLE 2- 
 
Lack of financial resources is significant in two of the ten activities. For one, 
mentioning a potential disaster in an organizational meeting, the sign is negative.  As the 
lack of financial resources shifts from a minor to major obstacle, the probability of 
mentioning a disaster in a meeting drops by 19%.   However, the sign is positive for the 
other significant relationship.  The probability of attending disaster-related 
meetings/training courses outside an organization increases by 16% as financial resources 
shifts from a minor to a major obstacle.  One interpretation of this counter-intuitive 
finding is that organizations seek assistance from outside their organization to provide 
needed information for their internal operations, a finding that is at least consistent with 
resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978).  One possible explanation might 
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be that risk managers are using their connections/network to organize disaster-related 
workshops /trainings at no cost to their organizations.  
The lack of support scale is significant for two of the dependent variables but the 
sign is an unexpected positive.  Indeed, the sign for lack of support is positive – though 
not always significant – for nine out of ten dependent variables. Responding 
organizations are 43% more likely to attend disaster-related meetings outside their 
organization as lack of support shifts from a minor to a major obstacle.  The other 
significant and positive relation for lack of support is for structural mitigation.  The 
probability for an organization to engage in structural mitigation increases by 37% as 
lack of support shifts from a minor to a major obstacle.  There are a couple interpretations 
for positive relations between lack of support and an increase in risk-reducing activities.  
For attending disaster-related meetings outside their organization, the finding possibly 
reflects organizations seeking information that members within their organization are not 
providing.  Alternately, when organizations structurally mitigate, obstacles – such as lack 
of organizational support- become more apparent.  Similarly, organizations that never 
tried a risk-reducing activity might not be as familiar with the presence of an obstacle 
from within their organization.   
Among the controls, Table 2 shows wholesale/retail, education, and health 
sectors, compared to “other” organizations, are significantly more likely to engage in 
many of the risk-reducing activities. This finding is contrary to that of Dahlhamer and 
D’Souza (1997), who found that there is no difference in preparedness between 
wholesale/retail sector and “other” businesses. Organizations from the education sector, 
in contrast, are less likely to engage in risk-reducing activities.     
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We end this section with a brief summary of an alternate analysis. We aggregated 
the ten activities by taking their overall mean into one single risk-reducing variable.  We 
then ran an ordinary least square regression model with the same independent variables 
as in Table 2. The results provide support for the trends in Table 2 by showing that lack 
of information is the only significant obstacle with a negative sign and wholesale/retail, 
education, and health sectors are significant controls.  
 
Conclusions 
A major preoccupation for practitioners and researchers involved in disaster 
management is developing an understanding of the factors associated with risk reduction 
based on empirical and systematically collected data (e.g., Lindell and Whitney 2000; 
Lindell and Prater 2002; Whitney et al. 2004).  In this study, we investigate the 
independent effect of three categories of organizational obstacles on organizational 
engagement in ten risk-reducing activities.  We started this study with two research 
questions; we now respond to them. 
What risk-reducing activities do organizations engage in? We find that 
organizations are most likely to engage in low-effort activities often indirectly linked to 
actual risk reduction (e.g., mentioned a potential disaster in an organizational meeting) 
and less likely to engage in high-effort activities more directly linked to risk reduction 
(e.g., engaged in structural mitigation measures).  While not expected, this finding directs 
outreach toward helping organizations shift their talk into action.  This result is also 
consistent with that of Dahlhamer and D’Souza (1997) who found generic risk-reducing 
activities to be more common than specific risk-reducing activities. 
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To what extent do organizational obstacles affect the adoption of disaster risk-
reducing activities?  The findings show that the most significant of all the obstacles is 
lack of information scale. This obstacle was not only significant in six of the ten risk-
reducing activities; it had the expected negative signs.  Lack of information was also 
significant for some of the more action-oriented activities, such as structural mitigation, 
vulnerability assessments, attending meetings outside their organization, holding disaster 
related workshops, discussing long-term strategies for recovery from disasters, and 
arranging site visits by consultants or experts to better prepare for disasters.   Lack of 
financial resources and support are less important obstacles.  Contrary to expectations, 
lack of financial resources and lack of organizational support may be associated with 
organizations attending meetings outside their organization. Lack of organizational 
support may also be associated with structural mitigation – a counterintuitive finding that 
may suggest that obstacles are more apparent when risk-reducing activities are 
undertaken.  While the framing of this analysis only tangentially builds from the 
theoretical underpinnings in organizational theory, the findings do provide support to the 
argument, that organizations’ activities reflect their dependence on external resources, 
specifically information (e.g., Pfeffer and Salancik 1978) 
Two lessons stand out from the current analysis.  First, this analysis shows that 
many organizations are engaged in activities that are precursors to more direct risk-
reducing activities, such as mentioning a potential disaster in an organizational meeting 
versus engaging in structural mitigation.  Planning to help organizations prepare for and 
mitigate disaster risks should focus on providing information that might shift 
organizational talk into action in part because information about the frequency of 
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disasters, disaster magnitude, and the benefits of planning and mitigation are associated 
with activities more related to actual reductions in risk.  At the very least, the reported 
findings support outreach programs that help communicate, or even visualize, disaster 
risks (e.g., Sandman et al. 1994; Mae Center 2006).  Second, the relationship between 
obstacles and risk-reducing activities is not always negative.   The multivariate analyses 
show that obstacles can be positively associated with risk reduction.  The implication is 
that, in some contexts, organizations might be more aware of the obstacles when 
attempting to reduce their risks from disasters.   
Akin to the findings from any research study, the findings herein face validity 
threats that researchers and practitioners should respect while drawing research lessons 
and policy implications.  There are certainly simultaneity among the independent 
variables and between the independent variables and the dependent variables. One could 
argue, for example, that the more disaster risk-reducing measures an organization adopts, 
the more information they obtain.  Additionally, we do not have information on some 
independent variables relevant to disaster risk reduction, such as past disaster experience 
and whether organizations lease or own their business property (Dahlhamer and D’Souza 
1997; Mileti 1999).  While the battery of risk-reducing activities herein captures the 
breadth of activities, the same measures are not mutually exclusive and some measures 
might be unrelated to actual risk reduction.  Finally, the results are perceptual, and we 
really do not know which of our organizations would survive until a disaster strikes.   
Indeed, it is quite possible that the measures used for the dependent variables are 
unrelated to the “true” level of organizational readiness in the wake of a disaster.  Despite 
these limitations, we expect that the lessons herein are not limited in strict terms just to 
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Memphis/Shelby County organizations.  While the extent of generalizability of the 
reported findings is an empirical question, we expect that lessons do apply beyond our 
sample to other organizations, especially private organizations, in other cities, though 
with understandable caution.  
Good science raises more questions than answers and we feel this analysis does 
just that.  Thus, this study suggests several next steps in understanding organizational 
responses to disaster risk.  First, while the ten activities capture a number of different 
risk-reducing activities, we recommend future research to investigate the relative costs in 
terms of time and effort for these activities and the subsequent perceived effectiveness in 
reducing disaster risks. Second, more research is needed to understand why organizations 
mentioned engaging in an activity that we think requires high effort (engaging in non-
structural mitigation measures) over those requiring low effort (e.g., attending disaster 
meetings/training courses within the organization). Third, we hope that future research 
will investigate why there is a positive relationship between some organizational 
obstacles and risk-reducing activities. Fourth, it would be interesting to examine to what 
extent senior managers tell lower level staff to adopt specific risk-reducing measures 
without providing the resources needed to adopt those measures. Fifth, does Memphis 
differ from another region of the United States with regard to the measures available to 
prepare for disasters? Lastly, it may interest the research community to investigate why 
organizations are not interested in adopting structural mitigation measures.  
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 1 
Table 1. Percentages of respondents at each obstacle level and obstacle means 
 
 
Independent Variables (Obstacles) 
1 
(Minor) 2 3 4 
5 
(Major) Mean 
Lack of financial resources to prepare for 
disasters (n=204) 19% 19% 27% 12% 24% 3.0 
Lack of convincing information about the 
potential impacts of disasters (n=196) 28% 14% 26% 21% 12% 2.8 
Lack of information about the frequency and 
magnitude disasters (n=195) 27% 19% 28% 15% 11% 2.7 
Unclear organizational benefits from disaster 
planning and mitigation (n=193) 33% 18% 22% 15% 11% 2.5 
Lack of support from mid- and lower-level 
organizational members (n=181) 43% 25% 23% 5% 4% 2.0 
Lack of support from upper-level 
management within your organization (n=183) 52% 20% 14% 6% 8% 2.0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 
Table 2. Changes in Predicted Probabilities for disaster risk-reducing activities from Logit Models 
 
  
Held 
Work 
Shops 
Attended 
Meeting 
Outside 
the Org. 
Vul. 
Ass’t to 
Estimate 
Losses 
Provide 
Info. To 
Custom 
& 
Comm. 
Structural 
Mitigation 
Long-
Term 
Response  
Site 
Visit by 
Experts 
Mention 
Disaster 
in 
Meeting 
Short-term 
Response   
Non-
Structural 
Mitigation 
Lack of Financial Resources 0.00 0.16* -0.20 -0.08 -0.07 -0.11 0.06 -0.19
+
 -0.19 -0.15 
Lack of Organizational 
Support Scale 0.31 0.43
+
 0.22 0.14 0.37* 0.14 0.04 0.05 -0.10 0.20 
Lack of Information Scale -0.73
±
 -0.66
+
 -0.43
+
 -0.11 -0.42
±
 -0.43* -0.42
±
 -0.10 -0.05 -0.11 
Education Sector 0.26
+
 0.23 0.33* 0.42
*
 0.00 0.23 0.12 0.18 0.20
+
 0.12 
Health Sector 0.18
*
 0.28* 0.04 0.21 -0.01 0.14 -0.06 0.15 0.22 0.21
±
 
Wholesale and Retail Sector -0.35
±
 -0.33* -0.42
±
 -0.25
±
 -0.22* -0.31
±
 -0.17 -0.29* -0.10 -0.08 
Pseudo R
2 
 0.18 0 .16 0.14 0.14 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.03 
 N 161 162 160 160 162 161 161 160 162 161 
Note: The numbers indicate changes in predicted probability of the dependent variable as the independent variables change from their 
minimum to their maximum holding other independent variables at their means. Robust standard errors clustered by seven 
organizational sizes. 
±
p<0.001, 
+
p<0.01, *p<0.05   
 1 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Dependent variables: Disaster risk-reducing activities taken by organizations in Memphis, 
Tennessee.  
